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PERSPECTIVE
best treated by a combination of psychotherapy and
medication.
The FDA’s recent analysis suggests that the risk
of emergent suicidality in children and adolescents
receiving SSRIs is real — but small. The FDA’s ad-
visors recommended stronger warnings in label-
ing and better information for patients and care-
givers, but they stopped short of recommending
contraindications for these drugs. However, many
participants in the public hearing seemed convinced
that the pharmacologic treatment of pediatric de-
pression should be banned or severely curtailed.
That would turn the clock back 25 years, to a time
when the only thing we could offer the families of
suicide victims was the hope that someday we would
have effective treatments. Ideally, the FDA, families,
and clinicians will find the right balance between
the risk of suicidality and another, greater risk: the
risk that lies in doing nothing.
From the Western Psychiatric Institute and Clinic, Department
of Psychiatry, University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, Pittsburgh.
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These are anxious times for academic medical cen-
ters, which have reacted to recent developments
with measures that were beyond contemplation in
a more optimistic past. Confronted by the challeng-
es of managed care, decreases in reimbursement,
restrictions on house-staff working hours, height-
ened scrutiny of clinical research, declining federal
support for medical education, and the growth of
formidable competitors such as hospital chains and
medical practices specializing in high-margin ser-
vices, academic medical centers can no longer be
complacent about their financial health or their rep-
utations as the best places to receive care. Many of
these institutions have political clout and access
to considerable private wealth, but none can count
on a bailout from government or donors if they
founder. Nearly all have adopted tighter manage-
ment practices and worked to eliminate inefficien-
cies. Many have reorganized, and some, like Stan-
ford University Medical Center and the University
of California at San Francisco, and Brigham and
Women’s Hospital and Massachusetts General Hos-
pital, have merged with erstwhile rivals. As these
institutions attempt to run themselves like other
large enterprises, their faculty, affiliated physicians,
and many others question whether a preoccupa-
tion with costs and revenues will distract them from
their traditional missions.
Anyone who believes that academic centers have
lost their way by adopting corporate practices must
surely have been alarmed by the news of a “part-
nership” between GE Medical Systems and New
York–Presbyterian Hospital, the organization that
resulted from the merger of the hospitals of Cor-
nell University and Columbia University. Under the
terms of this partnership, New York–Presbyterian
will spend a reported $500 million, over 10 years,
on products and services from GE, ranging from
imaging equipment to change-management pro-
grams to training in process-improvement and
quality-improvement programs. The agreement tied
together a broadly diversified medical products and
services business, with revenues of approximately
$9 billion at the time, with one of the dominant
health care providers in New York City, a 2400-bed
hospital system with $2 billion in annual revenue. 
Academic medical centers routinely spend mil-
lions of dollars on equipment from GE and its
competitors, and they engage consultants for ev-
erything from operational assistance to informa-
business and medicine
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tion technology support to strategy. Nevertheless,
the magnitude and scope of this agreement make it
stand out. And inevitably, a series of questions have
followed: Will this agreement really benefit the hos-
pital? Are aspects of the agreement likely to impair
competition among providers, or among suppliers?
Most important, is this transaction in the best in-
terests of patients and the public, as both parties
have claimed? Or will the quest for financial suc-
cess inevitably conflict with the hospital’s responsi-
bilities to the public?
Ultimately, only people who know the hospital’s
needs well and have seen the details of the agree-
ment can judge whether it was in the hospital’s in-
terest at the time it was negotiated. But even if it
seemed attractive then, things might look different
in hindsight. That is a risk with any long-term agree-
ment. The hospital’s forecasts of future demands
for GE imaging technology and reengineering and
management services could be far off the mark.
Both partners could be overly optimistic about the
operating savings that the consulting services will
provide — according to a press release from GE,
$100 million over five years. But every business
must make bets about the future, and skillful man-
agers rely on astute analysis of the best available in-
formation. Presumably the management and the
board of the hospital — which includes some of
the most prominent names in American business
— scrutinized the agreement thoroughly before
making a commitment of this magnitude. It would
be surprising if New York–Presbyterian failed to
secure highly favorable terms.
If, as GE undoubtedly expects, the discounts and
other aspects of its agreement with the hospital
freeze out competitors such as Siemens, the hos-
pital will be effectively tied to a single vendor for
many of its purchases. This “lock-in” has signifi-
cant potential disadvantages, especially if in a few
years GE’s offerings turn out to be much less attrac-
tive than those of its competitors. But there can be
important advantages as well. Reducing the num-
ber of vendors means that the hospital will pur-
chase fewer versions of similar products. Nurses in
some hospitals use five or six different types of in-
travenous infusion pumps that operate in slightly
different ways. These pumps are only one of the
many kinds of equipment that they routinely oper-
ate, and the complexity of their tasks multiplies
with each minor variation in a piece of equipment.
As the Institute of Medicine has noted, standardi-
zation and simplification can prevent errors. It can
also simplify staff training and lower ongoing
service costs. Similar simplification of vendor rela-
tionships and the integration of services and equip-
ment appeal greatly to hospital management.
Another potential problem is that GE Medical,
in its consulting role, could make recommenda-
tions that are not in the hospital’s best interest.
A hospital might want to draw on GE’s expertise in
deciding whether to replace a magnetic resonance
scanner with a newer, higher-resolution model.
Can GE Medical give disinterested advice about the
purchase of a product or service that it sells? The
potential for such a conflict is great when a vendor
offers as broad a range of products and services as
GE Medical does.
Conflicts of this kind are widespread. The busi-
ness world wrote off IBM as a corporate dinosaur
before it shifted its focus to profitable consulting
services, which became a vehicle for selling IBM
hardware and software. Many financial planners
dispense advice for minimal or no fees, earning
revenues from commissions on mutual funds that
they recommend. Financial conflicts are no less
common in medicine. Physicians routinely give pa-
tients advice about procedures that the doctors are
paid to perform, while nearly the opposite concern
arises in some managed-care settings, where phy-
sicians have financial incentives to withhold care. In
such instances, conflict can be limited by the so-
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phistication of the clients and the value the seller or
agent places on future business and reputation.
The drawbacks of obtaining guidance and services
from advisers whose interests diverge from those
of the client are unfortunate but generally accept-
ed, as long as there is full disclosure of the poten-
tial conflicts. Any such conflicts in GE’s role should
be known to the hospital, and GE surely recognizes
that the success of its relationship with New York–
Presbyterian and its ability to form other similar re-
lationships depend on the hospital’s continuing
satisfaction with the arrangement.
If GE’s quality- and process-improvement pro-
grams enable a hospital to make better use of its
operating rooms, eliminate unnecessary duplica-
tion of tests, and shorten waiting times in clinics,
the hospital and its patients benefit. But any con-
sultant could also help a hospital’s financial per-
formance by pursuing strategies that do not benefit
the public. Many academic hospitals could im-
prove their bottom lines by cutting the amount of
uncompensated care they provide and eliminating
unprofitable services. They might also promote ex-
cessive use of high-margin services. For example,
to the extent that physicians induce demand, any
hospital that owns a scanner — and any physician
who earns fees by interpreting scans — can raise
revenues by performing scans for less critical or
even dubious indications. Similarly, well-reported
phenomena such as “DRG creep,” “upcoding,” and
“unbundling” can increase health care expenditures
without benefiting patients. Such practices may
seem innocuous from the individual patient’s point
of view, if they merely raise health expenditures
generally. But a physician or hospital that takes ad-
vantage of reimbursement anomalies can also jeop-
ardize patients’ health. Physicians and hospitals can
be reimbursed more if a candidate for the place-
ment of multiple coronary stents has the procedure
divided among two or more hospital admissions
than if they are placed as part of a single complex
procedure. Is it plausible that clinical needs alone
explain why so many patients have stents placed as
part of multiple admissions?
No institution with a reputation to preserve —
whether for-profit or nonprofit, medical center or
consulting firm — can risk encouraging or engag-
ing in any practice that might be construed as
fraudulent or unethical. Nevertheless, one cannot
presume that what is good for the hospital and the
consultant is good for society. Does this imply that
a successful partnership between GE Medical Sys-
tems and New York–Presbyterian Hospital will not
serve the public interest and that such arrange-
ments should be discouraged? I believe that would
be the wrong conclusion. The problem is not that
GE Medical and its competitors are seeking to make
hospitals more efficient. The problem is that hos-
pitals are not always rewarded for providing care
that is both of the highest quality and appropriate.
The task of GE Medical is to help the hospital re-
spond to the incentives it faces. The responsibility
of those of us who are concerned about the future
of health care is to make sure that the incentives
they face are the right ones. It is a responsibility
that we cannot delegate.
From the Department of Veterans Affairs Palo Alto Health Care
System, Palo Alto, Calif., and Stanford University, Stanford, Calif.
A little more than 50 years ago, a hole inside a hu-
man heart was closed, with a machine maintaining
life while the surgery was done. Within the next
two years, four of eight children survived repair of
complicated congenital heart defects in operations
involving a similar machine. The heart–lung ma-
chine, as it was called, was invented and devel-
oped by John and Mary Gibbon (see Figure 1). Si-
multaneously, Forssmann, Cournand, and Richards
developed cardiac catheterization that permitted
anatomical and physiological diagnoses of heart
disease during life. With the discovery and com-
mercial production of the anticoagulant heparin,
these two innovations spawned the modern surgical
Cardiopulmonary Bypass after 50 Years
L. Henry Edmunds, M.D.
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